jueves, 13 de diciembre de 2012

Ethics Workbook I: World History Chapter 11 Enlightenment

Ethics Workbook I: World History Chapter 11

Enlightenment

After the Renaissance, individualism was a powerful new force in the world. This was a time when people began to try to figure out for themselves how the natural world worked. They stressed logical thinking and scientific experimentation. This period in history is called the Enlightenment. People became curious about everything, and wanted to study everything, including themselves. As part of this, they began to look again at ideas about right and wrong. But this time, they saw people as being part of nature, and subject to the same natural laws as everything else.

Benedict Spinoza

One important ethical thinker of this time was Benedict Spinoza. Let's see what he had to say.

People living in nature have a right to life, and a right to do whatever is necessary to protect and better their life. In other words, people will always protect themselves by trying to get what they think is good, and trying to avoid what they think is bad. This is just common sense. Problems arise because people are ruled by their emotions. Emotions are powerful urges that motivate actions. Because emotions are not carefully thought out, they are unpredictable and dangerous. When people are ruled by emotions, they often argue and fight with each other. The only way to protect yourself from violence is to threaten greater violence in return. This is why nature is so insecure.

Spinoza, Ethics 4,XXXVI Note II, ParaphraseEthics Workbook I

What you think about Spinoza’s opinion of emotions? Is he right about emotions leading to conflict and to violence? Try to give some examples from your own experience.

People naturally look for a safer way to live. This leads to the invention of governments and laws. Laws are written as an artificial way for people to create peace and harmony. This is the creation of what we call a state, and the people in it are called citizens. Good and bad are created by the state in the form of rules that the citizens must obey. Whatever promotes peace and harmony is good; whatever promotes discord is bad. It's the rules that define right and wrong. Good means to obey the law, bad means to disobey the law.

Spinoza,Ethics 4 XXXVI Note II, paraphrase

Spinoza saw that force ruled in nature and that this solution of creating a powerful authority to govern was no better; one way or the other, force still ruled. This would changehe thought, if reason rather than emotions directed human actions. Act according to reason, and everyone will agree. Harmony will result. This sounds good. But why should it work?

Like Aristotle, Spinoza believed that human reason, or the ability to think logically, was at the root of human nature. In fact, to be human was to be able to think. He concluded from this that human reason could never be out of sync with human nature, because reason

was the key element in human nature. In other words, if your actions are ruled by reason, you won't ever act in a way contrary to your own best interests. Here is how he said it:

Everyone, by the laws of nature, desires what they see as good and tries to avoid what they see as bad. If their decisions are governed by reason, which is the basis of human nature, they can only do what is also good for human nature.

Now here's the tricky part.

So, whatever is good for an individual’s human nature must also be good for everyone else’s. Therefore, when people act according to reason, and not emotion, they will always be in harmony with each other.

Spinoza, Ethics 4 XXXV simplified

This is a really good argument. See if you can explain it in your own words.

And, he says that even though reason may require you to give up something personally because it would not be in the best interests of everyone for you to have it or to do it, that this would still make you happy. In fact it’s the only way to true happiness.

Promoting the good of others creates happiness because it leads to self-esteem. When a person acts in another's interest and then thinks about it, he or she will approve of themselves. Spinoza called this self-approval, which he said was the highest object for which we can hope.

Spinoza, Ethics 4 LII, note

Spinoza seems to be saying that true happiness results from feeling good about ourselves, having self-esteem, and being satisfied with what we did, not from any external thing we might get. Think about this idea carefully. Is it true? Then write a short essay telling what you think.

Here is one last quote from Spinoza:

People who are governed by reason don't want anything for themselves that they don't want for the rest of mankind, and because of this, they are just,faithful, and honorable in their conduct.

Spinoza, Ethics 4 VIII

Why does this look so familiar? Do you see a theme developing in the history of ethical thought? What is it? Prepare to discuss this.

Immanuel Kant

Remember we said that the Enlightenment was a time of science when people tried to figure things out by studying nature. Not all people believed that right and wrong could be understood that way. One very important philosopher of that time was Immanuel Kant. He believed that he could figure out rules of ethics with pure logic, and reason, without looking at the real world at all. Kant believed that if people studied the real world to figure out rules for right and wrong they would end up with different answers because they would be reasoning from different particular situations. He wrote long and very complicated books trying to prove this. His works became the most famous ever written about right and wrong.

Kant’s writing is complicated, but his conclusions are very simple. He wanted to find one rule everyone must obey all the time. He gave this rule a fancy name, the Categorical Imperative. We will call it The Rule Everyone Must Obey All the Time. Here's how Kant said it:

I should never do anything unless I can honestly say I believe everyone else should always do the same thing.

Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, section 1Ethics Workbook I

What he came up with sounds a lot like the Golden Rule we've been seeing over and over again. Only Kant believed he improved upon it.

Here's how Kant said it works:

If I'm in trouble is it OK to make promises that I don't intend to keep? It may be profitable in the short run to lie, but is it right? Let's word this in a different way, and then apply our ethical rule. Should I lie to get out of a tight spot? Will this hold up as a rule that everyone must follow all the time? Can I say, “everyone should lie to get what they want?” If we put it this way, it's clear that I couldn't say this because it would mean that all promises would be no good. No one could ever trust anyone else, and this would destroy society.

Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, section 2

The key to using Kant’s rule is that you must think carefully and logically. Kant and Spinoza both thought that as long as everyone relied on reason they would always agree. Here are some more examples Kant gave to test his rule:

A man is very disappointed with his life and asks himself if it's OK to commit suicide. The man says: “I want to act in my own best interests, since I see only pain and suffering ahead, I will shorten my life.” Then he asks: “can this be a rule everyone must obey all of the time?” The answer is no, because it's a contradiction to say I will destroy a life in order to do what's best for that life.

You can also see what Kant means by logical thinking, and reason. Let's read another of his examples:

A man is rich and comfortable. He wonders if he should help poor and suffering people. He says: “why should I care? I don't take anything from poor and suffering people, and so I'm not obligated to give them anything either.” Can this be a law everyone must obey all the time? The answer is no because it would mean that you yourself could never expect any help, even if you desperately needed it. It would be illogical for anyone to want the world to be like this.

See how Kant is not using an argument based on the facts of any particular case, but looking only at pure logic. Make up an ethical problem and see if Kant’s Rule works. Try to think it through without using any specific details.

Compare Kant’s Rule: never do anything unless you can honestly say you believe everyone else should do the same thing, with Golden Rule stated: Do to others only what you would have them do to you. Now reread Kant’s example about giving charity. Can you show any ways in which following the Golden Rule causes possible problems? Try to think of some other examples of ways that the traditional Golden Rule doesn’t work and see if Kant’s idea works better.

Dignity and Respect

Man's ability to reason was really important to Enlightenment thinkers, especially to Immanuel Kant. Kant said that you could put a price on everything in the world except a human being. A human being was of infinite value. The reason for this was that humans were free, and ecided for themselves about the course of their lives. They don't exist to serve any other person or for any other reason but to be free for themselves. He called this human dignity. People alone have dignity.

Here is how Kant put it:

People exist only to live their own lives as they see fit, and must never be used by others just to further their own desires.

Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, section 2

Here is the important point. Since all people view themselves as having dignity, Kant’s rule requires everyone to give everyone else the same standing. In other words, if you don’t want to end up with a world full of users, you can never use anyone else only to further your own purposes. This is what Kant meant by treating other people with respect.

That you must never use anyone else only for your purposes doesn't mean that it's wrong to expect someone to clean your table in a restaurant, or to ask a clerk to show you a pair of shoes in a shoe store. The word only is the key. Try to think of some examples of a person using another person in a way that would violate Kant’s rule of respect. Do you think this is a good ethical rule to follow? How do you define respect? Why is having respect for other people so important?

Ethics Workbook I

©Anthony Tiatorio 1999

German philosophers vs. Greek philosophers: just for fun

People living in nature have a right to life, and a right to do whatever is necessary to protect and better their life. In other words, people will always protect themselves by trying to get what they think is good, and trying to avoid what they think is bad. This is just common sense.

Problems arise because people are ruled by their emotions. Emotions are powerful urges that motivate actions. Because emotions are not carefully thought out, they are unpredictable and dangerous. When people are ruled by emotions, they often argue and fight with each other. The only way to protect yourself from violence is to threaten greater violence in return. This is why nature is so insecure.

Spinoza, Ethics 4,XXXVI Note II, ParaphraseEthics Workbook I

Ethics Workbook I: World History Chapter 10.Renaissance

Ethics Workbook I: World History Chapter 10

Renaissance

After about a thousand years of feudalism, people began to question some of its basic ideas. This new period in history is called the Renaissance. It was a time of change in the way people looked at their relationship with the community they lived in.

Communalism was losing ground to the idea of individualism. Individualism stresses the importance of the individual people, and places them above the group. People began to believe that there was nothing wrong with striving to get things for themselves, and they became less concerned about their obligations to others.

The Renaissance was the beginning of what we call modern times. We still live in the modern age, and our society today still stresses individualism. So, this is a very important idea for us to study. It's a new way to look at life, and it changes things a lot.

All through the Middle Ages it was assumed that, for the most part at least, people try to do the right thing. In other words, people were by nature basically good. This was one idea that was seriously questioned by Renaissance thinkers. One famous philosopher at this time was an Italian named Nicolo Machiavelli. He wrote a book called The Prince which gave advice to political leaders. Let's see what Machiavelli said about the natural goodness of people.

In general, people are ungrateful, unreliable, false, cowardly and greedy. They will promise you anything, and then turn their back on you if things go wrong.

And don't think that the person who is closest to you is more reliable. Friendship is based on obligations, and people break obligations most easily.

Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapter XVI simplified

What to do you think? Are people basically good or basically bad? Is Machiavelli right?

Now, if you believe that people are the way Machiavelli says they are, your ideas about right and wrong will change.

Machiavelli wrote his book as a guide for the leader of his country. He believed that he government should not have to play by the same rules as ordinary people because the government cannot afford to lose. Do you think governments should have the same standards of right and wrong as ordinary citizens? What about when governments deal with foreign countries?

Here is some of what Machiavelli wrote:

Everyone says that the leader should be honest and trustworthy and not be sneaky. But it's easy to see that in the past leaders who get things done have paid little or no attention to this idea. They have simply outsmarted the others, especially those who keep their word. We all know that there are two ways of getting what you want. The first is through the rules, and the second is to take it by force. The leader must do both.

The leader should be half lion and half fox. The lion can't see the traps, and the fox can't fight off the wolves. Great leaders don't rely on either one or the other, but use both. Therefore, the wise leaders do not keep their word if it will hurt them or prevent them from getting what they want. If people were good this rule would not hold. But, because they are bad, and will lie and cheat you, you are not obligated to be fair and honest with them. But, it is necessary to disguise your dishonesty and to pretend to be good. People like to think that they are upright, and they are very easy to trick. You must appear to be virtuous, but only a fool actually is virtuous. Pretend to be kind, reliable, fair, honest and loyal. But be ready to do the exact opposite, as long as you don't get caught. It’s always best to stay with the good if you can, but only if it works, if not, you must be ready to change tactics. Remember, people must believe you are virtuous, so never give any hint that you are not. People only see what you show them, not what's really there.

Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Chapter XVIII simplifed

What was Machiavelli’s opinion of hypocrisy?

It seems that winning is the most important thing for Machiavelli. How important is winning in the things that you do? Does the urge to win sometimes lead to unethical actions? Can you give any examples from your own experiences?

Machiavelli seems different from earlier writers, but there is a very basic way in which he is identical to all the others. Reread the following sentence. See if you can figure it out? Why does he tell people to lie and cheat? What basic principle of ethics is he using?

If people were good this rule would not hold, but because they are bad, and will lie and cheat you, you are not obligated to be fair and honest with them.

Nicolo Machiavelli, T he Prince, Chapter XVIII simplified

Ethics Workbook I

©Anthony Tiatorio 1999

Ethics Workbook I: World History Chapter 9. The Middle Ages

Ethics Workbook I: World History Chapter 9

The Middle Ages

All of the societies we have studied so far have held individual people responsible for their actions. In fact, we could say that ethics is about individual decision making. But, we have also seen big variations in how people look at what's right or wrong. Next we're going to study a way of looking at right and wrong which stresses what's good for the group that the individual is part of. This idea holds that what's best for the group is most important, and, it ends up being what's best for each individual as well.

Before we get started, think about this issue. Should people try to do what's best for the group they belong to even if it might not be, at least in the short run, what seems best for them as individuals?

Feudalism

After the fall of Rome, the rule of law disappeared and Europe became a dangerous and lawless place. People naturally banded together and formed groups for their own protection. The land was divided into many small territories, which were defended by castles. Nobles and knights ruled, while peasants and serfs farmed the land. This so-called feudal system lasted for over a thousand years.

Feudalism’s ideas of right and wrong were based on what would best hold together a strong group. We call this idea communalism. A commune is a group of people living together and sharing what they have.

In feudal society people freely agreed to be ruled by other people and to do what they were told in return for protection. To seal these personal agreements, it was common to swear an oath of allegiance. The greatest crime that you could commit was to go back on your word and not stand by your oath. This was called a felony. The word felony is still used today to describe the most serious crimes.

Let's look at one of these feudal oaths.

I swear before God that I will be your true and faithful servant and be at your command. I will love what you love, and hate what you hate. I will not think or do anything of which you disapprove. In return you will stand by me, and protect me in all the ways we agreed to at the time I submitted myself to your authority.

Composite of several typical feudal oaths.

An oath is like a promise to do something. How important is it to keep your promises? Should promises be kept no matter what?

Thomas Aquinas

During this feudal era, the Catholic Church was very strong and most of the thinkers and writers were church people. One great philosopher who had a lot to say about right and wrong at that time was a Catholic priest named Thomas Aquinas. We're going to read some of his words and talk about them because they show the philosophy behind communalism.

Here is how Aquinas put it:

The parts of things exist for the sake of the whole. If a person had an infected finger, and it was threatening to spread and kill the person, then it would be right and good to cut it off. By the same reasoning, the person who is dangerous and infectious to the community can be rightfully killed to protect that community.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II-II, 64 simplified

You can easily see how strong this idea of protecting the group was. Think about the groups you belong to. How important are these groups to you? Write a short statement about groups in your life and prepare for a discussion.

One question that puzzled people who believed in communalism was whether a person should make a profit by selling something for more than it was worth.

Here is what Aquinas said:

It is wrong to sell a thing for more than its just price because it is deceiving and injuring your neighbor.

Buying and selling is intended for the common advantage of both parties. Therefore, there must be equality between them.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II-II,77 simplified

This is different isn’t it? Let's look closer at what Aquinas said. First of all he uses the term just price. This term means the same thing as fair price. But what does that mean?

Well, for people at that time, it meant that if you were selling something to make a living, you could set your price only as high as was necessary to pay your living expenses. In other words, you could expect to live comfortably at the level you were already at. You could not get rich by making big profits. For example, shoemakers had a certain lifestyle, as did carpenters and farmers, and so did everyone else. You could sell your goods only at a price that kept you at that level. The just price would change with people and places, but it was always intended to keep people from moving up, or down, the social ladder.

To sell anything for more than it is worth, or to buy anything for less than it is worth, is wrong and unlawful.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II-II,77

Compare this with the way trade is carried on today.

Thomas Aquinas had a lot to say about right and wrong. Let's see what he says about hypocrisy. Remember that hypocrites pretend to be something they’re not.

The seriousness of the wrong will depend on what end the hypocrite has in view. If the hypocrite intends to gain from it at someone else's expense, it is very serious, but if the hypocrite just enjoys pretending, then it's of lesser importance.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II-II,111,4

Here again we see that intent played a big role in how actions were judged. Let’s think about this question again, maybe you’ve changed your opinion. Do you think that the reason that motivated a person to do something can determine if that action was right or wrong?

©Anthony Tiatorio 1999

Plato's Myths

plato.stanford.edu

Plato's Myths

First published Thu Jul 23, 2009; substantive revision Wed Aug 10, 2011

What the ancient Greeks—at least in the archaic phase of their civilization—called muthos was quite different from what we and the media nowadays call “myth”. For them a muthos was a true story, a story that unveils the true origin of the world and human beings. For us a myth is something to be “debunked”: a widespread, popular belief that is in fact false. In archaic Greece the memorable was transmitted orally through poetry, which often relied on myth. However, starting with the beginning of the seventh century BC two types of discourse emerged that were set in opposition to poetry: history (as shaped by, most notably, Thucydides) and philosophy (as shaped by the peri phuseōs tradition of the sixth and fifth centuries BC). These two types of discourse were naturalistic alternatives to the poetic accounts of things. Plato broke to some extent from the philosophical tradition of the sixth and fifth centuries in that he uses both traditional myths and myths he invents and gives them some role to play in his philosophical endeavor. He thus seems to attempt to overcome the traditional opposition between muthos and logos.

There are many myths in Plato's dialogues: traditional myths, which he sometimes modifies, as well as myths that he invents, although many of these contain mythical elements from various traditions. Plato is both a myth teller and a myth maker. In general, he uses myth to inculcate in his less philosophical readers noble beliefs and/or teach them various philosophical matters that may be too difficult for them to follow if expounded in a blunt, philosophical discourse. More and more scholars have argued in recent years that in Plato myth and philosophy are tightly bound together, in spite of his occasional claim that they are opposed modes of discourse.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-myths/

plato.stanford.edu

Socrates pleads his case in his sentencing hearing

Socrates pleads his case in his sentencing hearing and talks about the true value of the individual agitator and rebel in society.

The Death of Socrates is a 1787 oil on canvas painting by the French painterJacques-Louis David.

The Death of Socrates is a 1787 oil on canvas painting by the French painterJacques-Louis David.

The Death of Socrates

Artist	Jacques-Louis David
Year	1787
Type	Oil on canvas
Dimensions	129.5 cm × 196.2 cm (51.0 in × 77.2 in)
Location	Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York

Like many of his paintings from that decade, the Death ofSocrates focuses on a classical subject.^[1] In this case, it is the story of Socrates’s execution, as told by Plato in Phaedo.^[2] In this story, Socrates, as punishment for criticizing Critias, the tyrant ofAthens, is told he must either drink the poison hemlock or face exile. Socrates, rather than fleeing, uses his death as a final lesson for his pupils, and faces it calmly.^[3]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Death_of_Socrates

martes, 11 de diciembre de 2012

1215 CARTA MAGNA/ 1689 BILL OF RIGTHS/ 1701 ACT OF SETTLEMENT/ 1787 USA Constitution/ 1789 Déclaration des droits de l'homme/ 1791-1793 Constitution française

foundation for social and civic life

The Constitution, as we know, is not just a compilation of laws. They’re laws based on, inspired and guided by values, the so-called “higher values”. But what is a higher value? It's best to find out first what a “value” is.

A value is whatever makes something preferred, desired. It is something that guides our behaviour. A value is something that, if it disappeared from the world, we would think that something important and irreplaceable, for example, beauty, harmony, truth, etc has disappeared. In terms of social life and citizenship, values are whatever guides and provides a foundation for social and civic life. The "higher values" are the basic, fundamental ones from which other less important ones will be derived and on which the laws of the Constitution are based. These laws cannot go against these values, rather they have to develop and guarantee them.

Magna Carta

Magna Carta. 1215
Juan, Rey de Inglaterra

Magna Carta

1215

Jonh, King of England (1167-1216)

John, by the grace of God King of England, Lord of Ireland, Duke of Normandy and Aquitaine, and Count of Anjou, to his archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls, barons, justices, foresters, sheriffs, stewards, servants, and to all his officials and loyal subjects, greeting.

Know that before God, for the health of our soul and those of our ancestors and heirs, to the honour of God, the exaltation of the holy Church, and the better ordering of our kingdom, at the advice of our reverend fathers Stephen, archbishop of Canterbury, primate of all England, and cardinal of the holy Roman Church, Henry archbishop of Dublin, William bishop of London, Peter bishop of Winchester, Jocelin bishop of Bath and Glastonbury, Hugh bishop of Lincoln, Walter Bishop of Worcester, William bishop of Coventry, Benedict bishop of Rochester, Master Pandulf subdeacon and member of the papal household, Brother Aymeric master of the Knights of the Temple in England, William Marshal, earl of Pembroke, William earl of Salisbury, William earl of Warren, William earl of Arundel, Alan de Galloway constable of Scotland, Warin Fitz Gerald, Peter Fitz Herbert, Hubert de Burgh seneschal of Poitou, Hugh de Neville, Matthew Fitz Herbert, Thomas Basset, Alan Basset, Philip Daubeny, Robert de Roppeley, John Marshal, John Fitz Hugh, and other loyal subjects:

1. First, that we have granted to God, and by this present charter have confirmed for us and our heirs in perpetuity, that the English Church shall be free, and shall have its rights undiminished, and its liberties unimpaired. That we wish this so to be observed, appears from the fact that of our own free will, before the outbreak of the present dispute between us and our barons, we granted and confirmed by charter the freedom of the Church's elections - a right reckoned to be of the greatest necessity and importance to it - and caused this to be confirmed by Pope Innocent III. This freedom we shall observe ourselves, and desire to be observed in good faith by our heirs in perpetuity. We have also granted to all free men of our realm, for us and our heirs for ever, all the liberties written out below, to have and to keep for them and their heirs, of us and our heirs:

2. If any earl, baron, or other person that holds lands directly of the Crown, for military service, shall die, and at his death his heir shall be of full age and owe a "relief", the heir shall have his inheritance on payment of the ancient scale of "relief". That is to say, the heir or heirs of an earl shall pay for the entire earl's barony, the heir or heirs of a knight l00s. at most for the entire knight's "fee", and any man that owes less shall pay less, in accordance with the ancient usage of "fees".

3. But if the heir of such a person is under age and a ward, when he comes of age he shall have his inheritance without "relief" or fine.

4. The guardian of the land of an heir who is under age shall take from it only reasonable revenues, customary dues, and feudal services. He shall do this without destruction or damage to men or property. If we have given the guardianship of the land to a sheriff, or to any person answerable to us for the revenues, and he commits destruction or damage, we will exact compensation from him, and the land shall be entrusted to two worthy and prudent men of the same "fee", who shall be answerable to us for the revenues, or to the person to whom we have assigned them. If we have given or sold to anyone the guardianship of such land, and he causes destruction or damage, he shall lose the guardianship of it, and it shall be handed over to two worthy and prudent men of the same "fee", who shall be similarly answerable to us.

5. For so long as a guardian has guardianship of such land, he shall maintain the houses, parks, fish preserves, ponds, mills, and everything else pertaining to it, from the revenues of the land itself. When the heir comes of age, he shall restore the whole land to him, stocked with plough teams and such implements of husbandry as the season demands and the revenues from the land can reasonably bear.

6. Heirs may be given in marriage, but not to someone of lower social standing. Before a marriage takes place, it shall be made known to the heir's next-of-kin.

7. At her husband's death, a widow may have her marriage portion and inheritance at once and without trouble. She shall pay nothing for her dower, marriage portion, or any inheritance that she and her husband held jointly on the day of his death. She may remain in her husband's house for forty days after his death, and within this period her dower shall be assigned to her.

8. No widow shall be compelled to marry, so long as she wishes to remain without a husband. But she must give security that she will not marry without royal consent, if she holds her lands of the Crown, or without the consent of whatever other lord she may hold them of.

9. Neither we nor our officials will seize any land or rent in payment of a debt, so long as the debtor has movable goods sufficient to discharge the debt. A debtor's sureties shall not be distrained upon so long as the debtor himself can discharge his debt. If, for lack of means, the debtor is unable to discharge his debt, his sureties shall be answerable for it. If they so desire, they may have the debtor's lands and rents until they have received satisfaction for the debt that they paid for him, unless the debtor can show that he has settled his obligations to them.

10. If anyone who has borrowed a sum of money from Jews dies before the debt has been repaid, his heir shall pay no interest on the debt for so long as he remains under age, irrespective of whom he holds his lands. If such a debt falls into the hands of the Crown, it will take nothing except the principal sum specified in the bond.

11. If a man dies owing money to Jews, his wife may have her dower and pay nothing towards the debt from it. If he leaves children that are under age, their needs may also be provided for on a scale appropriate to the size of his holding of lands. The debt is to be paid out of the residue, reserving the service due to his feudal lords. Debts owed to persons other than Jews are to be dealt with similarly.

12. No "scutage" or "aid" may be levied in our kingdom without its general consent, unless it is for the ransom of our person, to make our eldest son a knight, and (once) to marry our eldest daughter. For these purposes only a reasonable "aid" may be levied. "Aids" from the city of London are to be treated similarly.

13. The city of London shall enjoy all its ancient liberties and free customs, both by land and by water. We also will and grant that all other cities, boroughs, towns, and ports shall enjoy all their liberties and free customs.

14. To obtain the general consent of the realm for the assessment of an "aid" -except in the three cases specified above- or a "scutage", we will cause the archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls, and greater barons to be summoned individually by letter. To those who hold lands directly of us we will cause a general summons to be issued, through the sheriffs and other officials, to come together on a fixed day (of which at least forty days notice shall be given) and at a fixed place. In all letters of summons, the cause of the summons will be stated. When a summons has been issued, the business appointed for the day shall go forward in accordance with the resolution of those present, even if not all those who were summoned have appeared.

15. In future we will allow no one to levy an "aid" from his free men, except to ransom his person, to make his eldest son a knight, and (once) to marry his eldest daughter. For these purposes only a reasonable "aid" may be levied.

16. No man shall be forced to perform more service for a knight's "fee", or other free holding of land, than is due from it.

17. Ordinary lawsuits shall not follow the royal court around, but shall be held in a fixed place.

18. Inquests of novel disseisin, mort d'ancestor, and darrein presentment shall be taken only in their proper county court. We ourselves, or in our absence abroad our chief justice, will send two justices to each county four times a year, and these justices, with four knights of the county elected by the county itself, shall hold the assizes in the county court, on the day and in the place where the court meets.

19. If any assizes cannot be taken on the day of the county court, as many knights and freeholders shall afterwards remain behind, of those who have attended the court, as will suffice for the administration of justice, having regard to the volume of business to be done.

20. For a trivial offence, a free man shall be fined only in proportion to the degree of his offence, and for a serious offence correspondingly, but not so heavily as to deprive him of his livelihood. In the same way, a merchant shall be spared his merchandise, and a husbandman the implements of his husbandry, if they fall upon the mercy of a royal court. None of these fines shall be imposed except by the assessment on oath of reputable men of the neighbourhood.

21. Earls and barons shall not be amerced save through their peers, and only according to the measure of the offence.

22. No clerk shall be amerced for his lay tenement ecept according to the manner of the other persons aforesaid; and not according to the amount of his ecclesiastical benefice.

23. Neither a town nor a man shall be forced to make bridges over the rivers, with the exception of those who, from of old and of right ought to do it.

24. No sheriff, constable, coroners, or other bailiffs of ours shall hold the pleas of our crown.

25. All counties, hundreds, wapentakes, and trithings -our demesne manors being exccepted- shall continue according to the old farms, without any increase at all.

26. If any one holding from us a lay fee shall die, and our sheriff or bailiff can show our letters patent containing our summons for the debt which the dead man owed to us, our sheriff or bailiff may be allowed to attach and enroll the chattels of the dead man to the value of that debt, through view of lawful men; in such way, however, that nothing shall be removed thence until the debt is paid which was plainly owed to us. And the residue shall be left to the executors that they may carry out the will of the dead man. And if nothing is owed to us by him, all the chattels shall go to the use prescribed by the deceased, saving their reasonable portions to his wife and children.

27. If any freeman shall have died intestate his chattels shall be distributed through the hands of his near relatives and friends, by view of the church; saving to any one the debts which the dead man owed him.

28. No constable or other bailiff of ours shall take the corn or other chattels of any one except he straightway give money for them, or can be allowed a respite in that regard by the will of the seller.

29. No constable shall force any knight to pay money for castleward if he be willing to perform that ward in person, or -he for a reasonable cause not being able to perform it himself- through another proper man. And if we shall have led or sent him on a military expedition, he shall be quit of ward according to the amount of time during which, through us, he shall have been in military service.

30. No sheriff nor bailiff of ours, nor any one else, shall take the horses or carts of any freeman for transport, unless by the will of that freeman.

31. Neither we nor our bailiffs shall take another's wood for castles or for other private uses, unless by the will of him to whom the wood belongs.

32. We shall not hold the lands of those convicted of felony longer than a year and a day; and then the lands shall be restored to the lords of the fiefs.

33. Henceforth all the weirs in the Thames and Medway, and throughout all England, save on the sea-coast, shall be done away with entirely.

34. Henceforth the writ which is called Praecipe shall not be to served on any one for any holding so as to cause a free man to lose his court.

35. There shall be one measure of wine throughout our whole realm, and one measure of ale and one measure of corn -namely, the London quart-; and one width of dyed and russet and hauberk cloths -namely, two ells below the selvage-. And with weights, moreover, it shall be as with measures.

36. Henceforth nothing shall be given or taken for a writ of inquest in a matter concerning life or limb; but it shall be conceded gratis, and shall not be denied.

37. If any one hold of us in fee-farm, or in socage, or in burkage, and hold land of another by military service, we shall not, by reason of that fee-farm, or socage, or burkage, have the wardship of his heir or of his land which is held in fee from another. Nor shall we have the wardship of that fee-farm, or socage, or burkage unless that fee-farm owe military service. We shall not, by reason of some petit-serjeanty which some one holds of us through the service of giving us knives or arrows or the like, have the wardship of his heir or of the land which he holds of another by military service.

38. No bailiff, on his own simple assertion, shall henceforth any one to his law, without producing faithful witnesses in evidence.

39. No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any way harmed -nor will we go upon or send upon him- save by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.

40. To none will we sell, to none deny or delay, right or justice.

41. All merchants may safely and securely go out of England, and come into England, and delay and pass through England, as well by land as by water, for the purpose of buying and selling, free from all evil taxes, subject to the ancient and right customs -save in time of war-, and if they are of the land at war against us. And if such be found in our land at the beginning of the war, they shall be held, without harm to their bodies and goods, until it shall be known to us or our chief justice how the merchants of our land are to be treated who shall, at that time, be found in the land at war against us. And if ours shall be safe there, the others shall be safe in our land.

42. Henceforth any person, saving fealty to us, may go out of our realm and return to it, safely and securely, by land and by water, except perhaps for a brief period in time of war, for the common good of the realm. But prisoners and outlaws are excepted according to the law of the realm; also people of a land at war against us, and the merchants, with regard to whom shall be done as we have said.

43. If any one hold from any escheat -as from the honour of Walingford, Nottingham, Boloin, Lancaster, or the other escheats which are in our hands and are baronies- and shall die, his heir shall not give another relief, nor shall he perform for us other service than he would perform for a baron if that barony were in the hand of a baron; and we shall hold it in the same way in which the baron has held it.

44. Persons dwelling without the forest shall not henceforth come before the forest justices, through common summonses, unless they are impleaded or are the sponsors of some person or persons attached for matters concerning the forest.

45. We will not make men justices, constables, sheriffs, or bailiffs unless they are such as know the law of the realm, and are minded to observe it rightly.

46. All barons who have founded abbeys for which they have charters of the king of England, or ancient right of tenure, shall have, as they ought to have, their custody when vacant.

47. A11 forests constituted as such in our time shall straightway be annulled; and the same shall be done for river banks made into places of defence by us in our time.

48. A11 evil customs concerning forests and warrens, and concerning foresters and warreners, sheriffs and their servants, river banks and their guardians, shall straightway be inquired into each county, through twelve sworn knights from that county, and shall be eradicated by them, entirely, so that they shall never be renewed, within forty days after the inquest has been made; in such manner that we shall first know about them, or our justice if we be not in England.

49. We shall straightway return all hostages and charters which were delivered to us by Englishmen as a surety for peace or faithful service.

50. We shall entirey remove from their bailwicks the relatives of Gerard de Athyes, so that they shall henceforth have no bailwick in England: Engelard de Cygnes, Andrew Peter and Gyon de Chanceles, Gyon de Cygnes, Geoffrey de Martin and his brothers, Philip Mark and his brothers, and Geoffrey his nephew, and the whole following of them.

51. And straightway after peace is restored we shall remove from the realm all the foreign soldiers, crossbowmen, servants, hirelings, who may have come with horses and arms to the harm of the realm.

52. If any one shall have been disseized by us, or removed, without a legal sentence of his peers, from his lands, castles, liberties or lawful right, we shall straightway restore them to him. And if a dispute shall arise concerning this matter it shall be settled according to the judgment of the twenty-five barons who are mentioned below as sureties for the peace. But with regard to all those things of which any one was, by king Henry our father or king Richard our brother, disseized or dispossessed without legal judgment of his peers, which we have in our hand or which others hold, and for which we ought to give a guarantee: We shall have respite until the common term for crusaders. Except with regard to those concerning which a plea was moved, or an inquest made by our order, before we took the cross. But when we return from our pilgrimage, or if, by chance, we desist from our pilgrimage, we shall straightway then show full justice regarding them.

53. We shall have the same respite, moreover, and in the same manner, in the matter of showing justice with regard to forests to be annulled and forests to remain, which Henry our father or Richard our brother constituted; and in the matter of wardships of lands which belong to the fee of another wardships of which kind we have hitherto enjoyed by reason of the fee which some one held from us in military service; -and in the matter of abbeys founded in the fee of another than ourselves- in which the lord of the fee may say that he has jurisdiction. And when we return, or if we desist from our pilgrimage, we shall straightway exhibit full justice to those complaining with regard to these matters.

54. No one shall be taken or imprisoned on account of the appeal of a woman concerning the death of another than her husband.

55. All fines imposed by us unjustly and contrary to the law of the land, and all amerciaments made unjustly and contrary to the law of the land, shall be altogether remitted, or it shall be done with regard to them according to the judgment of the twenty five barons mentioned below as sureties for the peace, or according to the judgment of the majority of them together with the aforesaid Stephen archbishop of Canterbury, if he can be present, and with others whom he may wish to associate with himself for this purpose. And if he can not be present, the affair shall nevertheless proceed without him; in such way that, if one or more of the said twenty five barons shall be concerned in a similar complaint, they shall be removed as to this particular decision, and, in their place, for this purpose alone, others shall be subtituted who shall be chosen and sworn by the remainder of those twenty five.

56. If we have disseized or dispossessed Welshmen of their lands or liberties or other things without legal judgment of their peers, in England or in Wales, -they shall straightway be restored to them. And if a dispute shall arise concerning this, then action shall be taken upon it in the March through judgment of their peers- concerning English holdings according to the law of England, concerning Welsh holdings according to the law of Wales, concerning holdings in the March according to the law of the March. The Welsh shall do likewise with regard to us and our subjects.

57. But with regard to all those things of which any one of the Welsh by king Henry our father or king Richard our brother, disseized or dispossessed without legal judgment of his peers, which we have in our hand or which others hold, and for which we ought to give a guarantee: we shall have respite until the common term for crusaders. Except with regard to those concerning which a plea was moved, or an inquest made by our order, before we took the cross. But when we return from our pilgrimage, or if, by chance, we desist from our pilgrimage, we shall straightway then show full justice regarding them, according to the laws of Wales and the aforesaid districts.

58. We shall straightway return the son of Llewelin and all the Welsh hostages, and the charters delivered to us as surety for the peace.

59. We shall act towards Alexander king of the Scots regarding the restoration of his sisters, and his hostages, and his liberties and his lawful right, as we shall act towards our other barons of England; unless it ought to be otherwise according to the charters which we hold from William, his father, the former king of the Scots. And this shall be done through judgment of his peers in our court.

60. Moreover all the subjects of our realm, clergy as well as laity, shall, as far as pertains to them, observe, with regard to their vassals, all these aforesaid customs and liberties which we have decreed shall, as far as pertains to us, be observed in our realm with regard to our own.

61. Inasmuch as, for the sake of God, and for the bettering of our realm, and for the more ready healing of the discord which has arisen between us and our barons, we have made all these aforesaid concessions, wishing them to enjoy for ever entire and firm stability, we make and grant to them the following security: that the baron, namely, may elect at their pleaure twenty five barons from the realm, who ought, with all their strength, to observe, maintain and cause to be observed, the peace and privileges which we have granted to them and confirmed by this our present charter. In such wise, namely, that if we, or our justice, or our bailiffs, or any one of our servants shall have transgressed against any one in any respect, or shall have broken one of the articles of peace or security, and our transgression shall have been shown to four barons of the aforesaid twenty five: those four barons shall come to us, or, if we are abroad, to our justice, showing to us our error; and they shall ask us to cause that error to be amended without delay. And if we do not amend that error, or, we being abroad, if our justice do not amend it within a term of forty days from the time when it was shown to us or, we being abroad, to our justice: the aforesaid four barons shall refer the matter to the remainder of the twenty five barons, and those twenty five barons, with the whole land in common, shall distrain and oppress us in every way in their power, namely, by taking our castles, lands and possessions, and in every other way that they can, until amends shall have been made according to their judnnent. Saving the persons of ourselves, our queen and our children. And when amends shall have been made they shall be in accord with us as they had been previously. And whoever of the land wishes to do so, shall swear that in carrying out all the aforesaid measures he will obey the mandates of the aforesaid twenty five barons, and that, with them, he will oppress us to the extent of his power. And, to any one who wishes to do so, we publicly and freely give permission to swear; and we will never prevent any one from swearing. Moreover, all those in the land who shall be unwilling, themselves and of their own accord, to swear to the twenty five barons as to distraining and oppressing us with them: such ones we shall make to wear by our mandate, as has been said. And if any one of the twenty five barons shall die, or leave the country, or in any other way be prevented from carrying out the aforesaid measures, the remainder of the aforesaid twenty five barons shall choose another in his place, according to their judgment, who shall be sworn in the same way as the others. Moreover, in all things entrusted to those twenty five barons to be carried out, if those twenty five shall be present and chance to disagree among themselves with regard to some matter, or if some of them, having been summoned, shall be unwilling or unable to be present: that which the majority of those present shall decide or decree shall be considered binding and valid, just as if all the twenty five had consented to it. And the aforesaid twenty five shall swear that they will faithfully observe all the foregoing, and will cause them be observed to the extent of their power. And we shall obtain nothing from any one, either through ourselves or through another, by which any of those concessions and liberties may be revoked or diminished. And if any such thing shall have been obtained, it shall be vain and invalid, and we shall never make use of it either through ourselves or through another.

62. And we have fully remitted to all, and pardoned, all the ill- will, anger and rancour which have arisen between us and our subjects, clergy and laity, from the time of the struggle. Moreover have fully remitted to all, clergy and laity, and -as far as pertains to us- have pardoned fully all the transgressions committed, on the occasion of that same struggle, from Easter of the sixteenth year of our reign until the re-establishment of peace. In witness of which, more-over, we have caused to be drawn up for them letters patent of lord Stephen, archbishop of Canterbury, lord Henry, archbishop of Dubland the aforesaid bishops and master Pandulf, regarding that surety and the aforesaid concessions.

63. Wherefore we will and firmly decree that the English church shall be free, and that the subjects of our realm shall have and hold all the aforesaid liberties, rights and concessions, duly and in peace, freely and quietly, fully and entirely, for themselves and their heirs from us and our heirs, in all matters and in all places, forever, as has been said. Moreover it has been sworn, on our part as well as on the part of the barons, that all these above mentioned provisions shall observed with good faith and without evil intent. The witnesses being the above mentioned and many others. Given through our hand, in the plain called Runnymede between Windsor and Stanes, on the fifteenth day of June, in the seventeenth year of our reign.

Fuente:

http://hc.rediris.es/dos/constituciones/html/magna2.htm